The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has stated that its goal is to foster sustainable homeownership. In this paper, we propose some metrics for evaluating the degree to which the FHA is attaining this goal for first-time homebuyers. This work uses New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel data to examine the long-term outcome for households that make the transition from renting to owning using an FHA-insured mortgage. In addition to calculating the fraction of these borrowers whose FHA homeownership experience ends in default, we measure the degree to which these borrowers successfully remain homeowners after paying off their credit risk to the FHA. For the 2001 and 2002 cohorts, which were less impacted by the financial crisis than later cohorts, we find that 12 percent had their homeownership experience end in default while around 55 percent sustained their homeownership without the need for an FHA mortgage. Another 20 percent are either in their original home or have moved but continue to use an FHA mortgage. To view the authors' disclosure statements, visit https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr839.html.
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The Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), David Stevens, in remarks delivered on December 12, 2009, defined the purpose of the FHA as follows.
"As a mission-driven organization, FHA's goal is to provide sustainable homeownership options for qualified borrowers." 1 These remarks followed a remarkable increase in the scope of the FHA mortgage insurance program in response to the financial crisis and housing bust. This comment by Commissioner Stevens is important in that it clarifies a goal of the FHA program.
2 However, this clarity was not followed up by the FHA with a definition of "sustainable homeownership." Nor was there any documented attempt by the FHA to develop metrics to track their progress toward this objective, or a commitment by the FHA to make this information available to the public in the future.
Program evaluation is an integral part of any effective program-government or private. We illustrate in this paper that advances in data availability offer the opportunity for the FHA to both define what it means by sustainable homeownership and to measure its progress against this definition. We believe that it would be beneficial for the FHA to be transparent in this effort and to report on not only its definition and metrics, but also on its progress on an annual basis. Improved tracking of long-term outcomes of FHA borrowers will better help inform the FHA on program design. This should lead to improved outcomes over time and enhanced public support.
We focus our analysis on first-time homebuyers who are an important market segment for the FHA. The mission of sustainable homeownership is particularly relevant for these new homeowners. The benefits of a government mortgage insurance program that helps to facilitate the transition from renting to owning rests importantly on the success of these new borrowers in remaining homeowners in the future. However, to date, the FHA has not systematically tracked the progress of its first-time homebuyers after they pay off their credit risk to the FHA. We use the New York Fed's Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) data to do this analysis starting with the 2002 cohort of FHA first-time homebuyers.
A brief history of FHA Mortgage Insurance
The Great Depression created a crisis in mortgage finance. During the 1920s due to state and federal legislation most mortgages originated by banks were interest only with terms between five and ten years. 3 Mortgages were considered highly illiquid by banks and therefore they did not want to commit funds for long terms. 4 At maturity, borrowers would have to either roll over the mortgage or sell their house. Most states restricted banks and insurance companies from lending more than 50 percent of the appraised value of the house. 5 This made housing very difficult to purchase. Households either had to save the considerable downpayment amount, or take out a 2 ndand possibly even a 3 rd -lien mortgage at high interest rates and initial fees. 6 Second-lien mortgages tended to have terms of one to three years and required amortization.
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This system of mortgage finance was inherently instable due to the rollover risk facing borrowers. Even for borrowers who managed the high downpayment, if house prices fell then additional equity would be required in order to refinance the mortgage. For borrowers who used a second mortgage to help finance the purchase, access to this financing might be difficult in periods of economic stress. 8 At the time of the refinancing, borrowers would also be subject to the risk of monthly payment shocks if mortgage rates had increased. Borrowers who had positive equity but who could not roll over their mortgage faced the risk that they would not be able to sell the house in time to avoid default. Potential buyers might themselves find it difficult to attain mortgage credit in order to complete the purchase. 3 The National Bank Act of 1864 prohibited national banks from holding mortgages with terms greater than five year. See Gries and Ford (1932) , page x. In contrast, the average term for mortgages from building and loan associations (and mutual savings banks in the northeast) tended to vary from seven to twelve years. Building and loan associations and life insurance companies generally originated amortizing mortgages. Mutual savings banks and insurance companies were moving toward amortized mortgages. Gries and Ford (1932) , page 20, 26. See also Lloyd (1994) . 4 See Gries and Curran (1928) , page 5. 5 See Herzog (2009) . 6 Origination fees for second mortgages typically were 15 to 20 percent of the loan balance. See Gries and Ford (1932) , page 28. These high fees were a means of avoiding usury laws that applied to interest rates. See Gries and Curran (1928) , page 10. The seller of the property often holds the third mortgage if one exists, Gries and Curran (1928), page 11. 7 Second liens reduced the downpayment in many cases to less than 10 percent. See Gries and Ford (1932) Vandell (1995), page 302. 18 This annual fee was unchanged until 1983 when it was replaced with an up-front premium of 3.8 percent that could be financed into the balance of the mortgage. In 1990, the 0.5 percent annual fee was reinstated for a specific duration depending on the LTV. See Vandell (1995) , page 332. 19 FHA representatives had to meet with each state legislature in order to amend state restrictions against lending institutions holding the types of mortgages to be guaranteed by the FHA. See Lloyd (1994) , page 65. Pinto (2015) . 25 This reflected legislative changes in 1954 , 1956 , 1957 , 1958 , 1959 and 1961 . See McFarland (1963 , Table 7 .
house price appreciation) increased from 76.5 percent in 1950 to 91.5 percent in 1961. 26 Currently, the minimum downpayment is 3.5 percent. 27 In addition, borrowers today can finance their up-front mortgage insurance premium which further raises the origination LTV and hence borrower leverage.
The move to a 30-year term and minimal downpayment shifted the FHA's focus over time from sustainable to "affordable" homeownership. Fisher (1951) writing before the significant liberalization of FHA insurance requirements commented on the likely futility of trying to maintain affordability in a rising house price environment by relaxing underwriting terms.
"As prices rise, and it becomes difficult, in spite of the liberalization of mortgage terms, for purchasers to make the required down payments and to carry the necessary monthly payments, a demand ordinarily develops for further lengthening of term and reduction of down payment. Such changes assume, however, that the debt service will be reduced. For it to be so prices would have to remain unchanged. In a buyer's market, they probably would, but apparently not in a seller's. In the latter it is more likely that the liberalization of mortgage terms will increase both the price and the amount of the debt, with debt service remaining approximately unchanged." (page 82)
In this case, further demands for liberalization of lending terms are often made.
A direct consequence was a dramatic increase in default rates on FHA mortgages. Table 8 . 27 This applies to borrowers with a credit score of 580 or higher. 28 In contrast, mortgages with LTVs of 80 or less accounted for only 1.2 percent of all foreclosures and 12.4 percent of total insured mortgages. McFarland (1963) , Table 12 . 29 Foreclosures in the early 1950s were also subdued due to rapid house price appreciation.
7 "There can be no question that the assumption by FHA of progressively increasing risks to accomplish the legislative objective of making home purchases more widely possible has had an influence on the recent FHA property acquisition experience."
From 1977 to 2013, the average FHA default rate had increased to twelve percent-forty times higher than the rate over its first 20 years.
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This default rate is inconsistent with claims that the FHA has remained focused on sustainability. Going forward, if the FHA maintains a goal of sustainable homeownership, then it would be helpful to take accountability for the goal and produce a scorecard on its performance relative to this goal.
Measuring Sustainability of Homeownership
What are the factors that one would look at in defining and measuring the sustainability of homeownership for first-time buyers? A clear case where sustainability is not met is when the borrower defaults and loses the house damaging his/her credit rating. Conditional on a default, it will take years for the borrower to repair his/her credit and potentially again transition back to homeownership. 31 To date, the FHA has not clarified what default rate it views as compatible with a goal of sustainable homeownership. This is an important first step.
As discussed in Caplin et al (2015) , in the case of the FHA default should be measured at the borrower and not the mortgage level. The FHA has an internal refinance program that allows borrowers with FHA-insured mortgages to refinance even if they are in negative equity. In fact, borrowers can refinance multiple times. This is a sensible program given that the FHA already has the credit exposure to the borrower and a lower mortgage rate will reduce the likelihood of a default. 32 During the housing bust and the Great Recession, this internal refinancing activity was quite prevalent. As a result, if we followed a first-time FHA purchase mortgage and observed that it was paid off in full, this could be associated with an internal refinance and not a sale of the house and pay down of the FHA's credit exposure to the household. In addition, the refinance mortgage 30 See Pinto (2015) . Also, see Vandell (1995) for a discussion of the FHA and broader housing policy from the 1970s to the early 2000s. 31 See Brevoort and Cooper (2010) . 32 See for example Tracy and Wright (2016) and Fuster and Willen (forthcoming) .
8 that replaces the original purchase mortgage could subsequently end in default. Consequently, we need to follow the borrower through any FHA refinance mortgages connected to the purchase mortgage to determine if the borrower defaulted or successfully paid off the credit risk to the FHA.
Previously, this was a difficult empirical exercise for outside researchers, but could easily be done using internal FHA data. As we will discuss, new data allow us to compute FHA default rates at the borrower level.
On the other end of the spectrum, those first-time borrowers who sustain their homeownership by remaining homeowners consist both of those households that move and those that don't move. For the households that move and remain homeowners, we can divide them into those that no longer rely on an FHA-insured mortgage and those that still have an FHA-insured mortgage. Similarly, for those households who did not move, we can divide them into those that refinanced to a non-FHA-insured mortgage and those that still have an FHA-insured mortgage.
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For both the movers and the stayers who remain homeowners, we may want to count as more successful those households who have "graduated" out of the FHA system. For the movers, we want to allow for the possibility that a household may rent for a brief transition period between homeownership experiences. The length of this period needs to be selected so that if the household is not observed owning a home during this period, then we are comfortable treating this as a real break in the homeownership experience.
In this partition of FHA first-time homebuyers, the remaining group consists of those households who pay off their credit risk to the FHA without a default, but who do not transition to a new homeownership experience during the allowed period of time. That is, these are households who are observed continuously renting for the full time period selected following the pay down on their credit risk to the FHA. Like defaulters, this group did not sustain their homeownership.
However, the costs of their failure to do so are much less than for the group of defaulters.
Implementing this partition of the long-term outcomes of FHA first-time homebuyers involves considerable demands on the data. Initially, we need to be able to identify first-time FHA purchase mortgages apart from trade-up FHA purchase mortgages. The FHA classifies a purchase mortgage as a first-time mortgage if the borrower has not had a mortgage in at least three years. A 9 cleaner identification would look to see that there are no mortgage liens in a borrower(s) full credit history.
Having identified the set of FHA first-time homebuyers, we need data that allow us to track these households over time and observe any subsequent mortgage liens and the locations of the properties that secure them. 34 This combination allows us to properly measure FHA default rates for first-time homebuyers. In addition, the availability of subsequent mortgage lien and location information allow us to classify households that transition to new homeownership experiences and those that transition to renting. Loan level mortgage servicing data will not meet these data requirements.
FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel
Here we describe the data that we use to produce an example scorecard on sustainability of FHA first-time homebuyers. The FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) is a five percent random sample of U.S. households with credit files derived from Equifax where we can follow the credit files of the household members over time. The quarterly data begin in 1999. In addition to a detailed summary of the households' credit at each point in time, the data have scrambled mailing addresses for the household along with zip codes and county information. Narrative codes are provided which allow us to identify mortgage liens as FHA, VA, GSE securitized and "Other" (privately securitized and bank portfolio). 35 For each mortgage, the current balance and the payment status as of the end of that quarter is provided.
The CCP satisfies the data requirements for our sustainability scorecard. We are able to create a cleaner identification of first-time FHA homebuyers than the official FHA measure by being able to look at the entire history of the households' credit files back to 1999 in conjunction with the information indicating the age of the oldest mortgage including open and closed mortgages on the credit report. We define a first-time mortgage as the first appearance of an active mortgage since 1999 and no trace of any prior closed mortgages on the borrower's credit report. We start our 34 In the CCP data the location information is the mailing address for the borrower. 35 The GSE mortgages originated by some lenders were not coded as such and we classified them as "other". Consequently, the GSE category is an undercount of the GSE population.
analysis with the 2001 cohort of first-time homebuyers. This gives us a much longer window than the FHA's definition using a 3 year window.
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By observing the mortgage balance and location of the household, we can identify internal FHA refinances. This allows us to follow a household from its first-time FHA purchase mortgage through any subsequent FHA refinances to the final disposition of the FHA credit exposure on that property. If any subsequent internal refinance mortgage goes into default, we link that default back to the original purchase mortgage.
The CCP also allow us to determine if a household continues homeownership following the payoff of its FHA first-time credit exposure. We can identify if the household moves addresses, remains in the same zip code or moves to a new zip code, and whether they acquire a new mortgage lien. We interpret the absence of any mortgage lien associated with a different address as evidence that the household is renting.
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FHA First-Time Homebuyers
Dimensions of the First-Time Market
We turn now to using the CCP data to provide some description informative on first-time homebuyers in general and on FHA first-time homebuyers in particular. Beginning that year, the Uniform Residential Loan Application collected this information in Section VIII m. 37 We would misclassify situations where a household inherits a parents' house and moves in without a mortgage, or inherits enough wealth to be able to pay cash for a house. 38 Note that the peak in purchase mortgage originations was three years prior to the peak in house prices.
share increased reaching 51 percent in 2010. Over the next three years, the first-time share again dropped, reaching back to 42 percent in 2013. Since then, the first-time share has recovered somewhat and held steady at around 45 to 46 percent. 39 Appendix Figure VA first-time cohorts were from 3 to 6 percent-at most half the default rates for the same FHA cohorts. A higher fraction of these VA cohorts, though, transition to renting after paying off their 41 The combination of moving and remaining homeowners implies that these households purchased a tradeup home and financed it with a non-FHA mortgage. 42 Vandell (1995) In this paper, we have demonstrated that data are now available to track a variety of measures of sustainability. This demonstrates the feasibility for the FHA to develop a sustainability scorecard. The objective of this paper was neither to argue for any particular definition of sustainability, nor to define numerical goals for any specific measure. Rather, the objective was to illustrate that there are no data related obstacles prohibiting the FHA from undertaking this analysis and reporting on its findings. By doing so, the FHA can better run its program and thus maintain taxpayer support. 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 18 For completeness in Figures A2 and A3 we provide sustainability scorecards for the remaining two first time mortgage categories-GSE and Other. In each of these cases, there is not a similar reason to distinguish between movers who purchase a trade-up house using a similar type mortgage. However, for comparability we break out these two categories as before. 
